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RENEWED NON-DISCRIMINATION AND 
EQUALITY PROMISES FOR NATIONAL 
MINORITIES IN EUROPE 
This Working Paper explores evidence for the use of recently renewed, extended, non -
discrimination, and equality mechanisms like Full and Effective Equality and 
Substantive Equality. While we found evidence for the use of positive action and 
renewed forms of non-discrimination mechanisms, we also found that these reforms are 
still in their infancy and only seldomly used for the improvement of the situation of 
national minorities. This seems to be due to top-down measures, which are not 
structurally implemented and are therefore missing a link with social reality. This 
Working Paper combines different disciplin ary perspectives such as social science, 
political science and international law. However, the following does not provide a 
comprehensive overview or a strictly analytical discussion of the case law and literature 
on the topic of non-discrimination and equality. Rather, it offers an analysis of the 
research we conducted at ECMI.  
We would like to give our special thanks to Dr. Tove Hansen Malloy, director of the 
European Centre for Minority Issues and our ECMI supervisors Dr. Alexander Osipov and 
Dr. Andreea Udrea for their support and critical review on the content of this working 
paper.
 
Liefke Dolmans & Elisabeth Kühn  
November 2013 
ECMI Working Paper # 72 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the founding principles of the 
European Union is the recognition that every 
individual is of equal value.
1
 On top of this, 
the 2000 Race Directive
2
 reaffirms the 
principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. 
Discrimination and inequality are 
nevertheless still major problems for 
vulnerable ethnic and national minorities in 
Europe, as the results of the most recent EU 
MIDI-survey describes.
3
 Bearing in mind 
the principle of equality, it is not surprising 
that two new equality concepts arrived at the 
Council of Europe and EU level in the last 
years: „The new commitment to equality and 
non-discrimination‟ and „full and effective 
equality.‟ In a communication Note from 
July 2008, the European Commission 
expressed its desire for this „renewed 
commitment to non-discrimination and 
equal opportunity,‟ which proposes a shift 
from formal equality to a more substantive 
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equality approach.
4
 In this paper, we will 
consider whether this statement is an 
exemplary expression of an assumed 
development in the EU, namely that of 
broadening and strengthening equality and 
non-discrimination legislation and, 
furthermore, whether a possible 
development from formal to substantive 
equality is also effectively taking place. We 
analysed whether this trend is only visible in 
the European Commission or also present 
within other players in the non-
discrimination and equality field. We then 
sought to understand whether this trend is 
visible in theory as well as practice. This 
paper furthermore analyzes whether this 
trend enlarges the protection scope against 
discrimination for national minorities, or if 
this equality manifestation truly supports 
national minorities to be recognized as 
equals with the majority.  
Part of this shift from formal to 
substantial equality is, inter alia, the idea of 
a change in non-discrimination legislation. 
Specifically, non-discrimination will need to 
be extended in scope and depth of its 
application, in particular concerning indirect 
discrimination. Changes in discrimination 
law could therefore be an evidence of such a 
change in the protection of national 
minorities. Second, we examined if the 
„renewed commitment to non-discrimination 
and equality‟ of the European Committee 
and „Full and Effective Equality‟ (FEE) are 
current manifestations of genuine equality. 
In order to the changed attention for 
substantive equality we searched for 
empirical evidence substantiating these 
proposed developments, restricted to its 
value to and use for national minorities. Two 
closely connected research areas were 
designed to find evidence for these new 
proposed developments, one relating to the 
concept of equality and one to the 
mechanism of non-discrimination. In both 
areas a few research questions where 
formulated.  
For the area of equality we began with 
the examination of the question “what do we 
understand by „equality‟? What kind of 
different forms of equality exist and which 
form of equality would, if any, provide 
genuine equality for national minorities or 
which form of equality would place a 
minority on the same (society) level as the 
majority? And, along the same lines, is there 
a difference between a general equality 
mechanism and an equality mechanism for 
minorities? More practically, what is the 
implementation level of the examined 
equality notions for national minorities in 
the European Union? What is meant by Full 
and Effective Equality and what evidence 
can be found specifically for its use? 
Secondly, we formulated several questions 
for the area of non-discrimination, such as: 
how should a substantive non-discrimination 
mechanism look? And, is there evidence for 
such an extended mechanism? As it cannot 
be emphasized enough, the research tasks 
are embedded in the broader question of 
how desirable such a development is and/ or 
how efficient regarding the claims of 
national minorities. Some of the above 
questions are more answered than others. 
However, they have in common that they 
formed a way of thinking we used 
conducting this paper.  
The first part of this working paper 
contains different theoretical notions of 
equality, while the second part will focus on 
eventual extended non-discrimination 
mechanisms. Part three has a more practical 
approach through searching for evidence of 
an extended manifestation of equality and in 
particular the use of FEE.  
All three parts will include details of the 
proposed transition from a purely formal to 
a more substantive equality approach. Just 
as has been said before, we will start this 
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paper with an introduction regarding the 
definition of equality.  
II. EQUALITY NOTIONS, 
FORMAL EQUALITY & 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
International law has no comprehensive and 
overall accepted definition of equality.
5
 
Therefore, speaking about a single principle 
of equality is not possible and even 
problematic. According to Gosepath, the 
idea of equality should be understood as a 
„complex group of principles forming the 
basic core of today‟s egalitarianism.‟6 This 
working paper begins therefore with an 
exposition of several distinctive equality 
notions which, although not completely, 
form the main idea of equality. The equality 
notions discussed below are those of formal 
equality, substantive equality, equality of 
opportunities and equality of results or 
outcome. Depending on which equality 
principle one adopts, contrary outcomes 
arise.
7
 To get a view of the current use of 
equality, we will examine how the different 
notions of equality are defined, by whom, 
and what kind of role they have in the 
current equality debate for national 
minorities.  
Many international law instruments 
have reinforced the equal enjoyment of 
equality, if only in terms of formal equality, 
equality before the law, equal protection of 
the law and equality before courts and 
tribunals.
8
 By rethinking the notion of 
equality, we see that formal equality is 
today‟s most commonly used form of 
equality. Formal equality is based on 
individual justice and the merit principle. It 
focuses on equality among individuals, 
formal neutrality and procedural justice.
9
 
This is why formal equality is mostly known 
as the approach behind the general 
prohibition of unjustified direct 
discrimination. In this formal, liberal or 
symmetrical equality approach lies the 
assumption that „likes should be treated 
alike‟10 and that it is prohibited to treat 
people differently on particular grounds 
without a justified reason. Its underlying 
logic, of equal rights to all, requires 
inequality to be eliminated. 
A weakness of this restrictive formal 
equality approach is that it only provides a 
minimal standard of protection against 
discrimination. It requires a comparator in 
order to identity discrimination.
11
 Formal 
equality is essentially passive and static and 
does not assure any particular outcome, „as 
it disregards the inherent collective 
dimension of inequality such as group 
membership, entrenched inequality or 
societal realities.‟12 But most of all, formal 
equality does not provide space for social 
mobility and social restructuring, and 
thereby reaffirms the current status quo 
between the majority and the minority.  
The „prohibition of different 
treatment‟ is similarly the strength of formal 
equality as well as its weakness. In 
situations where people are „alike‟, equal 
treatment is often seen as „most equal.‟ 
Nevertheless, in situations in which people 
are „unlike‟ it might be more equal to treat 
individuals or groups differently in order to 
overcome the inequality their characteristics 
or disadvantages bring them. To bridge this 
very restrictive „equal treatment gap‟ in the 
non-discrimination principle, the notion of 
substantive equality has been developed. 
Substantive equality gives a solution 
to the above inflexibility of the „prohibition 
of different treatment‟, since it works with 
the presumption that „likes should be treated 
alike, but that unlike should be treated 
unlike‟.13 From this starting point 
substantive equality recognises that there is 
sometimes a need to treat people differently 
because they have different needs. 
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Substantive equality by means of positive 
action „reflects a deliberate attempt of social 
engineering towards underrepresented 
interest groups,
14
 like (some) national 
minorities. 
Substantive equality
15
 focuses on 
group characteristics and disadvantages, 
group impact, actual results, material 
equality and desired outcome.
16
 Substantive 
equality addresses many of the formal 
equality weaknesses, and especially stresses 
current national minority protection 
mechanisms: by not requiring a comparator, 
focusing on the outcome and, very important 
in this case, by addressing group 
dimensions.
17
 However, substantive equality 
runs the risk of giving too little attention to 
individual inequalities. 
18
 Most importantly, 
when it comes to substantive equality in 
cases of national minorities, it opens the 
door for different treatment or positive 
discrimination through positive action.
19
  
Although there is no common 
agreement on the definition of equality of 
opportunities, this is the third equality 
notion we want to discuss. Fortunately, there 
is however more or less an agreement about 
the idea that equality of opportunities is 
based on the thought that all people should 
be treated identical, unimpeded by artificial 
barriers like ancestry or wealth. Equality of 
opportunities is therefore the opposite of 
nepotism.
20
 The general idea of how to 
achieve equality of opportunities is to 
remove arbitrariness from selection 
procedures. This form of equality is 
therefore restricted to selection procedures 
only, and it is under discussion in how far 
equality of opportunities says something 
about the result or outcome of this 
procedure.
21
 To make it even more 
complicated, there are two different kinds of 
equality of opportunities to distinguish. The 
notion could be interpreted in a formal 
equality way and in a substantive one.
22
 The 
main difference between the two 
interpretations is, however, not if but when 
in the procedure the unfair arbitrariness 
should be removed. In formal equality of 
opportunities persons are assessed on their 
merits. For example, in the competition for 
resources like jobs, houses etc., „the 
applicant deemed most qualified according 
to appropriate criteria is offered the 
position.‟23 Formal equality of opportunities 
requires „that applicants be assessed by 
appropriate criteria relevant to perform on 
the post and that the most qualified 
candidate be offered the post.‟24 During a 
selection procedure arbitrary preferences are 
excluded as far as possible. So in short, 
Substantial equality of opportunities goes 
further by correcting unequal arbitrariness 
already before the selection procedure. 
Substantive equality of opportunities could 
be therefore a strong method to gain social 
mobility for socially disfavoured or 
vulnerable (national minority) groups. Some 
multiculturalists however argue that equality 
of opportunities should stress the identity of 
the individual‟ (minority member) more.25 
Equality of results and the strongly 
related concept of Equality of outcome are 
the fourth equality concepts of this paper 
and clearly also the farthest going. Both 
concepts go beyond the equalization of the 
starting point, which they consider as 
insufficient and ineffective to obtain real 
substantive equality for minorities since they 
focus only on the outcome and actual 
equality of results. 
26
 Some scholars argue 
that „equality of opportunities is in fact the 
measurement by which equality of outcome 
should be established‟.27 
Non-discrimination mechanisms are 
at least in theory strongly connected to 
equality, with non-discrimination forming 
an important part of the equality 
mechanism.
28
 Non-discrimination 
mechanisms give minimum protection 
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through formal equality or against 
unjustified discrimination and extra 
protection through substantial equality in the 
form of positive action or justified 
discrimination. It is nevertheless the 
question if formal and substantive non-
discrimination mechanisms have the same 
protection or effect of equality for the 
majority as for minorities. In the following 
chapter we will examine what revised non-
discrimination mechanisms can do for 
enlarging national minority protection. 
 
III. NON-DISCRIMINATION AND 
NATIONAL MINORITIOES 
Just as there is no definition of equality, 
there is also no comprehensive and 
simultaneously overall-accepted definition 
of the term „non-discrimination‟.29 The 
smallest common denominator in all 
variants is the core that „likes should be 
treated alike, unless there is an adequate 
justification‟.30 As the European 
Commission phrases it, „the non-
discrimination principle requires the equal 
treatment of an individual or group 
irrespective of a certain personal 
characteristic.‟31 All other details of specific 
non-discrimination legislation depend on the 
respective equality approach underpinning 
it.
32
  
Non-discrimination is considered to 
be the main feature of a formal approach to 
equality.
33
 It also plays a major role in any 
legal framework or legislation specifically 
designed for national minorities.
34
 However, 
the non-discrimination mechanisms of such 
special frameworks often differ in their 
character from general non-discrimination 
that can be found in a legal framework that 
goes beyond protection of a particular social 
group. It shall suffice here to say that the 
latter mechanism is broader and less specific 
in its detail, just because its scope extends, 
in comparison, to a more specific social 
group.
35
 
To consider the details of this idea, 
one has to bear in mind that the term non-
discrimination can be interpreted rather 
broadly. Given this fact, there has been a 
recent development within these possible 
interpretations of non-discrimination, 
namely the idea of phrasing these general 
non-discrimination mechanisms in a way 
that accommodates claims from minorities.
36
 
If this would indeed be the case, non-
discrimination has to change its character 
from being fundamentally connected to 
formal equality towards a non-
discrimination that also reflects a 
substantive equality approach.
37
 
Non-discrimination can – and should 
- be designed to feature in a particular 
minority protection framework.
38
 That aside, 
there has been an increasing recognition of 
the role that general non-discrimination 
mechanisms can play in supporting 
(national) minority rights.
39
 Pentassuglia 
labelled it the „fourth movement‟ of 
minority protection, that of a „jurisprudential 
assessment of minority claims within the 
human rights canon.‟40 Such general non-
discrimination mechanisms have the 
valuable advantage that they do not depend 
on the minority being recognized by the 
respective state and bearing a certain 
„official status.‟41 
Before we look for evidence of this 
„fourth movement‟, it is useful to think 
about how exactly such non-discrimination 
mechanisms look. Given the broad variety 
of different interpretations and specific 
tailoring, we will first consider those aspects 
of such a mechanism that are relevant in this 
context. Subsequently, we will design an 
ideal type
42
 of a general non-discrimination 
mechanism that in its composition would be 
suited best to accommodate and cater for 
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national minorities, to test the principles 
behind the discrimination mechanism of the 
fourth movement. 
From all the categories and aspects 
that can shape a non-discrimination 
mechanism, four are of relevance in this 
context. First, the scope of the mechanism is 
of interest. It is divided into the scope 
concerning persons, ratione personae, and 
the scope concerning the context, ratione 
materiae.
43
 The former lists the possible 
grounds of discrimination covered, e. g. 
gender, race or ethnicity. It also gives 
information as to whether multiple 
discrimination
44
 is covered. The latter 
explains which contexts the mechanism can 
cover, e. g. employment or education. It also 
shows if the present mechanism is 
„accessory‟ or not, meaning if it can only be 
invoked in combination with other specific 
codified rights.
45
  
Second, the mechanism can 
(theoretically) be restricted to cover direct 
discrimination only, which in European law 
„is when one person is treated less 
favourably than another is, has been or 
would be treated in a comparable situation 
on grounds of his or her protected 
characteristic.'
46
 Direct discrimination is 
therefore defined by the ECRI as 'any 
differential treatment based on a ground 
such as race, colour, language, religion, 
nationality or national or ethnic origin, 
which has no objective and reasonable 
justification. Differential treatment has no 
objective and reasonable justification if it 
does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there 
is not a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be 
realized‟.47 This is in contrast to indirect 
discrimination, which covers treatment or 
actions that are neutral at face value, but 
which eventually have a discriminatory 
result.
48
  
Third, it is important to distinguish 
between discrimination mechanisms that 
allow room for interpretation to 
accommodate positive action and special 
measures, and those that do not.  
Finally, the fourth important aspect 
is the jurisdiction‟s approach to the burden 
of proof or the decision of the judge, and 
which party needs to prove an alleged 
discrimination. In a substantive equality 
discrimination case, there are two stages. In 
the first stage, the claimant establishes facts 
to prove the alleged unlawful discrimination 
or, in other words, the claimant must make 
out a prima facie case. If the judge is 
convinced that there is a discrimination case, 
the burden of proof shifts to the accused 
party, i.e. it is their task to prove that the 
different treatment was justified. However, 
if the accused party does not succeed in this, 
he or she could be charged with 
discriminatory behaviour. In national 
minority cases, it is in the interest of the 
minorities that the justification stages shift 
to the accused party, since it is often very 
difficult to prove this latter stage.  
Considering these four particularly 
relevant aspects or dimensions of a general 
non-discrimination mechanism, what then 
would be the ideal type for the cause of 
minority rights‟ claims, which we could use 
then as a research hypothesis to examine in 
contrast to our empirical findings? 
Regarding the first aspect, the scope of the 
mechanism, the provision should in general 
be as broad and comprehensive as possible, 
and enumerate all grounds and contexts that 
are open to an interpretation for minority 
right‟s causes. That means grounds such as 
race, ethnicity, religion, language etc., and 
multiple discrimination claims should be 
possible.
49
 The rationae materiae should 
also be undifferentiated, meaning that the 
mechanism does not differ whether 
economic or civil and political rights are 
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concerned.
50
 Preferably, it should also be 
non-accessory.  
Second, the ideal, general non-
discrimination mechanism for national 
minorities should cover both direct and 
indirect discrimination. Regarding the third 
dimension named above, it should include 
positive action and special measures, and 
finally, it should display a reversed burden 
of proof for vulnerable groups such as 
national or ethnic minorities.
51
 
This ideal type has been used for the 
empirical research on the relevance of 
general non-discrimination mechanisms for 
national minorities. If evidence of this ideal 
type exist, is this more development from 
the top, i.e. is it an interpretation fostered by 
states in their legislation, and by jurisdiction 
in their ruling? Or can relevant proof be 
found that this is more the result of a 
bottom-up development, meaning that 
national minority members and activists on 
their behalf (NGO‟s and ombudspersons) 
pushed the interpretation of non-
discrimination more towards the ideal type?  
The most systematic and 
comprehensive research that was possible 
given the constraint on time and the 
character of the resources were the 
publications of the European network of 
legal experts, the Anti-Discrimination Law 
Review and the databases of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR). Due to time 
constraints we covered the available data of 
the last ten years. The results and findings 
from the national courts and academic 
publications are far from comprehensive, but 
do at least give some indication.  
First, concerning the evidence of this 
ideal type mechanism, we found eight 
significant cases of the ECtHR within the 
last ten years.
52
 The non-discrimination 
Article of the ECHR, Article 14, was mostly 
invoked with the provisions on the freedom 
of religion and the right to life that are set 
down in the Charta in Articles 2, 9 and 11 
respectively. From our design of the ideal 
non-discrimination mechanism, those cases 
showed that the interpretation of non-
discrimination by the Court provided room 
for positive action and indirect 
discrimination; several cases used a reverse 
burden of proof
53
, and undifferentiated 
scope and even an explicit commitment to a 
more substantive equality approach.
54
  
What is more, one has to bear in 
mind the expansion of non-discrimination 
legislation in the EU since the Race Equality 
Directive, ED 2000/43 in 2000. Race as a 
ground of discrimination is particularly 
relevant and useful for national minorities 
due to the possibility to interpret the term 
„race‟ in very broad sense.55 According to 
reviews, the implementation of both 
Directives is slow and with interruptions, 
but is nevertheless considered an 
improvement.
56
 So far, there is no case 
concerning national minorities referring to 
the provisions of the EDs at the ECJ level.
57
  
Evidence against such a development 
of non-discrimination mechanisms is the 
fact that Article 14 is still subsidiary. Also, 
no case on discrimination brought forward 
by a national minority member and 
concerning that characteristic (directly or 
indirectly) was brought before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
within the last 10 years. However, it should 
be pointed out that there is one, yet 
unpublished case from 12
th
 May 2011 (from 
the small available information, it does in all 
likelihood concern a national minority 
member‟s language right), which is certainly 
worth following up on.
58
 
The European Network of legal 
experts in the non-discrimination field 
expressed an opinion on this ruling that 
„[g]iven that the law complained of 
indirectly but intentionally excluded Turkish 
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Cypriots from its scope, this should have led 
the Court to the conclusion that the said law 
contained indirect discrimination prohibited 
by law.‟59  
More clarity on the interpretation of 
indirect discrimination and the shift of the 
burden of proof is given by the CJEU in the 
Tyrolean Airline Case, the Coleman and 
Meister Cases. 
60
 
The only other positive 
demonstration of general non-discrimination 
for national minorities was the reference in 
some NGO‟s reports about the increasingly 
blurred lines between national minorities 
and other vulnerable social groups, such as 
migrants and refugees. Often noted was the 
issue of discrimination against second-
generation immigrants occurring when a 
group stops being considered immigrants 
and becomes a „recognized‟ national or 
ethnic minority – or should be recognized as 
such.
61
 This link to the debate of „old‟ vs. 
„new‟ minorities62 is the most solid one 
found in NGO‟s statements on general non-
discrimination mechanisms and national 
minorities. Other than that, the issue of non-
discrimination refers to the special legal 
frameworks for national minorities, with the 
FCNM and the ECRML as the most 
prominent examples. No statement on the 
increased use of non-discrimination 
provisions or the demand for a different (i.e. 
reflecting more the ideal type) interpretation 
of these mechanisms could be found. Also, 
very few discrimination cases concerning 
national minorities were brought to the 
attention of equality ombudspersons.
63
  
When it comes to the use of general 
non-discrimination mechanisms by 
minorities and thereby one aspect of a 
development from a formal to a more 
substantive equality approach, the empirical 
result is rather disappointing thus far. The 
„fourth movement‟ of minority rights 
protection in Europe is mostly the result of a 
top-down process, meaning it is 
predominantly furthered by national or 
supranational legislatives and by Court‟s 
jurisdictions. It is less the result of a bottom-
up process from minorities themselves, or 
activists on their behalf.
64
 
In brief, it seems that non-
discrimination has been extended in its 
meaning. Nevertheless, the move from 
formal to substantive equality does exist, 
however critical one may see this progress. 
The next section will take a closer look at 
what this development means for national 
minorities and if these developments in non-
discrimination law are a way to gain genuine 
equality for national minorities or if more 
interventions such as positive action are 
needed. 
 
IV. NATIONAL MINORITIES 
AND SPECIAL MEASURES 
In the area of non-discrimination and 
equality minority, equality is a specific 
domain. An important but often overlooked 
tension in the field of equality is the tension 
between equality and the freedom for a 
minority to remain different. 
65
 Minorities 
are in other words looking for an acceptance 
of their differences while also seeking 
equality.
66
 „Standard conceptions of equality 
tend to mean assimilation to a pre-existing 
and problematic male or white or middle -
class norm‟67 and do not provide that 
because of real equality to minorities. 
Another important but still ongoing debate 
in the field of minority equality is the 
question of what kind of equality claim 
minorities have. Two kinds of equality 
claims could be distinguished; the claim of 
recognition and the claim of distribution. 
68
 
In contrast, the claim of distribution is 
mostly associated with the (re)distribution of 
wealth and resources and with socio-
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economic discrimination.
69
 Also, the claim 
of recognition has been related to (legal) 
questions of identity and group belonging 
and to forms of cultural discrimination.
70
 
Another important question underlying this 
debate is how to define a concept of genuine 
equality for minorities that provides equality 
with the majority and at the same time 
protection and promotion of the separate 
identity of minorities.
71
 Landmark cases like 
the Albanian Minority Schools Case already 
addressed as early as in 1935 the modern 
understanding of what genuine equality for 
minorities contains, including the possibility 
for differential treatment of minorities in 
international law. However, the advisory 
opinion of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (P.C.I.J.) at that time 
was not precise in how this aim should be 
reached. Even today the question of how to 
reach genuine equality for national 
minorities is more than liveable. It becomes 
however clearer and clearer that to reach 
more equality for national minorities it is at 
least sometimes needed, in addition to 
general non-discrimination protection, to 
give national minorities special rights to 
protect their distinctive culture and special 
characteristics. To be clear, these special 
minority rights should be (when allowed by 
a state) in addition to general citizens‟ rights 
like anti-discrimination protection.  
One way to secure national minorities‟ 
special equality rights is through positive 
action, special measures or affirmative 
action. Three words that are often 
interchangeable, associated with substantive 
equality, and used for measures that 
generate positive discrimination, but which 
could be defined slightly differently.
72
 „Positive action’ is a European 
generic notion of positive action, where 
„special measures’ are mostly a European 
notion for positive action often used in the 
specific context of national minorities. Some 
European sources also make temporal 
differences between positive action and 
special measures. Whereas special measures 
have often been used (with the exception of 
some UN documents) as temporarily special 
measures, positive action is generally not.
73
 
Temporary measures address the idea that 
there will be at certain moment „equality‟ 
between the minority and the majority. 
Coming back from this theory, it is the 
question if in reality the divisions between 
minority and majority ever will vanish. 
More relevant is the question of whether this 
path leads to assimilation, which is certainly 
not the goal of minority protection. 
 Temporary measures have however 
the danger that the majority claims that 
measures are satisfied because of equality 
improvements without reaching genuine 
equality between both groups. More positive 
is the fact that there is application of the 
principle of substantive equality. 
74
 Lastly, 
the definition of ‘affirmative action’ is 
mostly used for a general notion of a 
temporary measure aimed at redressing 
historical disadvantages of a particular 
group (often women and ethnical or other 
minorities), mostly used in the US and 
Canada.
75
  
There is not only less uniformity in 
the definition of special rights for minorities, 
but, as we will see, there are also a lot of 
problems with its implementation. This 
makes it difficult for national minorities to 
enjoy special rights. In some cases the 
situation is even worse and states even 
discriminate national minorities under the 
name of such a special measure. To 
understand these problems, it is however 
needed to give an overview of the current 
most important European legislation in 
regard to equality mechanisms for national 
minorities.  
From the legal national minority 
protection perspective, Article 4.1 of the 
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Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (in the following, 
FCNM) is the most important legal 
provision when it comes to formal equality. 
76
 Article 4.1 makes clear that formal 
equality or the right „of equality before the 
law and equal protection before the law‟ 
applies for persons belonging to national 
minorities. More concrete for the situation 
of national minorities, the latter could be 
interpreted as meaning that members of a 
minority should be treated before the court 
in exactly the same way as members of the 
majority, but also that a state has the duty to 
treat its citizens equally. More general but 
nevertheless important are the explicit words 
given for the protection against 
discrimination based on membership of a 
national minority in Article 21 of the charter 
for fundamental rights of the European 
Union.
77
 
From the legal perspective of 
national minority protection, the 
fundamental provisions that guarantee 
substantive equality are Article 4.2 and 4.3 
of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). 
Article 4.2 of the FCNM guarantees 
substantive equality through 'the adoption of 
special measures', but only of course where 
necessary and when its aim is justified. 
As the adoption of special measures, 
used for different treatment between groups, 
is discriminatory in character, and since 
discriminatory treatment is prohibited by 
many international covenants, there was a 
need for a special Article inside the FCNM 
to address this problem. This Article makes 
clear that „special measures‟ of Article 4.2 
of the FCNM not shall be considered to be 
an act of discrimination.‟78 The explanatory 
report on the FCNM states on top of this 
paragraph 4.2 that its purpose is to make 
clear that special measures „shall not to be 
considered as contravening the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination.‟79 Article 
4.3 according to the FCNM Explanatory 
Report aims in addition to Article 4.2 to 
„ensure persons belonging to national 
minority‟s effective equality along with 
persons belonging to the majority.‟80 
Through a close reading of the Articles 4.2 
and 4.3 we could see this aim as substantive 
equality or literally as Full and Effective 
Equality. Here, Article 4.2 states that „the 
parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, 
measures in order to promote, in all areas of 
economic social, political and cultural life, 
full and effective equality between persons 
belonging to a national minority and those 
belonging to the majority.'
81
 Nevertheless, it 
is somewhat unclear why the authors of the 
Explanatory Report use the terms „full and 
effective equality‟ (in paragraph 39 pertinent 
to Article 4.2) and „effective equality‟ (in 
paragraph 41 pertinent to Article 4.3) 
interchangeably. 
The same goes for provision 5 of the 
2000 Race Directive (RED).
82
 In this 
Article, positive action has „full equality‟ as 
its practical aim. Another similarity becomes 
visible by the fact that the directives do not 
oblige states to take positive action, since 
the Articles only require states to implement 
positive action. According to the European 
Commission, „positive action‟ under Article 
5 indicates „the purpose of positive actions 
but it does not render it compulsory.‟83 
Which implies that a state could not be 
obliged through this Article to implement 
positive action for the protection of 
(national) minorities? The explicit notions of 
the words „prevent or compensate‟ for group 
disadvantages, in Article 5, however, allows 
for „proactive and corrective policies.‟84  
Although Article 5 of the 2000 Race 
Directive and Article 4.2 of the FCNM have 
large similarities it is good to distinguish the 
application scope of both legal instruments. 
The FCNM covers only national minorities, 
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whereas the race directive addresses mainly 
protection against race and ethnic 
discrimination in employment, social 
protection and access to goods and 
services.
85
  
This section concluded with a closer 
look at the different forms of positive action; 
the next section provides the aim of these 
actions: „full and effective equality‟ (FEE). 
We will not only discuss the notion, but we 
will also see if FEE paves the way for more 
equality of national minorities. 
Enough evidence, which special measures 
allow for a compensation for the „natural‟ 
distinction to the majority - now and in the 
future. Especially because this natural 
distance to a majority is exactly what a 
minority represents. Through special 
measures, disadvantages in the distance to 
the majority could be reduced without 
hurting the minority identity. This however 
shows that, ideally, special measures for 
minorities need to be of a permanent 
character, and also this implies that special 
measures should not be qualified as an 
exception to the equality principle, but as a 
permanent action. 
V. FULL AND EFFECTIVE 
EQUALITY & GENUINE 
EQUALITY 
Full and Effective Equality for minorities 
implies genuine equality between minorities 
and the majority. That this notion of 
„complete‟, „genuine‟ or „absolute‟ equality 
is self-contradictory becomes clear when 
looking to the explanation of equality given 
by the Stanford encyclopaedia of 
philosophy.
86
 It states that „two non-
identical objects are never completely 
equal; they are different at least in their 
spatiotemporal location. If things do not 
differ they should not be called ‘equal,’ but 
rather, more precisely, ‘identical.‟87 From 
this point of view, genuine equality between 
minorities and the majority would often 
imply (forced) assimilation - an unwanted 
situation when speaking about national 
minorities.
88
  However, even if „identical 
equality‟ is unwanted in most areas when 
speaking about minorities, an improvement 
of minority rights is very wanted. Therefore 
we wanted to know what “Full and Effective 
Equality” implies in practice. For this, we 
looked how the idea of Full and Effective 
Equality is used, in its more restricted 
governmental context but also as a broader 
ideal model. To differentiate between both 
meanings, we will write the governmental 
notion with capitals and the ideal model 
notion without. We also analysed how these 
equality notions (formal equality, 
substantive equality, Full and Effective 
Equality) were defined and used by its 
authors, and we searched for the inter-
relation and connection of the particular 
equality concepts. This latter is of special 
importance, since the actual level of 
protection of an equality notion depends 
largely on the interpretation of a notion. 
Full and Effective Equality seems at first 
glance to be a very progressive and 
promising term when associated with 
minorities; unfortunately this term is not 
clearly defined. Article 4.2 of the FCNM, 
however, provides a starting point to a more 
concrete definition of FEE. The central 
thought of Article 4.2 of the FCNM says 
that it is the duty of states to promote FEE 
through special measures. Also, the 
preamble of Protocol No.12 of the ECHR 
reaffirms, „that the principle of non-
discrimination does not prevent State Parties 
from taking measures in order to promote 
full and effective equality, provided that 
there is an objective and reasonable 
justification for those measures.‟89 
Unfortunately, neither the Framework 
Convention nor the Explanatory Report to 
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the FCNM gives an explanation of how FEE 
should be interpreted. Neither does the 
Advisory Committee on the FCNM (ACFC) 
give an explanation for how it defines 
'effectiveness' or 'full' in the explanatory 
report. Nonetheless, ACFC presents in its 
Commentary on Participation two 
interpretations of their understanding of 
FEE.
90
 In these interpretations FEE is, on 
the one hand, described as a „result‟ of 
Effective Participation and, on the other 
hand, is defined, as a „package‟ of the 
different aspects of formal equality and 
substantive equality, complete with some 
aspects of the equal opportunities principle 
is highly wanted.
91
 This means that states 
should respect „the right for a minority to 
have a different identity‟, one separate from 
the collective identity.
92
 
 
In the first interpretation, ACFC describes 
FEE as the satisfied situation of effective 
participation, which could be interpreted as 
an „end stadium or ideal stage of effective 
participation‟. The second interpretation also 
describes a high ideal of minority protection 
at both the individual and group level. 
Compared to the first definition, this 
package notion of FEE defines more 
specifically a sort of ideal stage, although 
hard or even unlikely to reach. Also, this 
model is unclear about when this ideal or 
end stage of FEE has been reached, which 
makes the notion less precise or even 
useless.  
Besides this, the second notion 
entails the risk of fulfilling the given 
requirements without reaching a genuine 
equality situation between the minority and 
majority. Despite the given uncertainties 
regarding the definition, the second notion 
of FEE provides its most precise working. 
For this reason, we will use the second 
definition of FEE in this working paper.  
In addition to the above, the 
Explanatory Report of the FCNM makes 
clear that the convention itself does not 
include a separate provision dealing with the 
principle of equal opportunities. The reason 
given for this was - according to the 
Report‟s authors - that „such an inclusion 
was considered unnecessary as the principle 
is already applied in paragraph 4.2 of the 
convention.‟93 This quote is interesting for 
this research, since it could mean that the 
CoE Committee drafting FCNM (CAHMIN) 
did not make (at least not everywhere in 
their commentaries) a clear difference 
between equal opportunities and FEE. 
Following CAHMIN‟s chosen line, it seems 
strange that ACFC did not choose to write a 
commentary about FEE, but one about 
„effective participation‟, a notion, which 
although very needed for the 
accommodation of national minorities, 
according to ACFC was not even worth a 
provision in the FCNM.  
 
One of the questions we tried to 
answer during our research was: Who 
employs the notion of FEE? In a nutshell, 
this question can be answered as follows: 
There are very few organisations outside the 
Council of Europe (ACFC particularly) that 
use the notion of FEE. This seems to be 
obvious since the term FEE is the major aim 
in the fulfilling of the FCNM. In a few 
cases, other organisations, such as the 
European Fundamental Rights agency, refer 
to the notion of FEE in direct relation to the 
FCNM. Other found sources for the use of 
FEE were the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo or 
officially the Comprehensive Proposal For 
the Kosovo Status Settlement 2007 (Article 
2, para 2.4). FEE has also been included in 
the Constitution of Kosovo (Article 58, Para 
4) and the Law No. 03/L-047 on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
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Communities and Their Members in 
Kosovo, (Article 1).
94
 
Our search for positive 
demonstrations of FEE in the non-
governmental field was nevertheless quite 
disappointing. Only in very rare situations 
did we find that organisations or scholars, 
for example Jabareen
95
 make use of the 
notion of Full and Effective Equality. In 
these cases it was remarkable that FEE most 
of the time was not used in relation to the 
FCNM, but used to describe an „ideal 
situation of minority protection‟. 
Unfortunately, the organisations did not 
always make clear how they interpret FEE. 
Sometimes it is not even clear if 
organisations distinguish between Full and 
Effective Equality, Full Equality, Genuine 
Equality, and Effective Equality.  
With these outcomes, we can make a 
first preliminary conclusion, in which Full 
and Effective Equality in its meaning of a 
package of formal, substantive and equal 
opportunities is particularly a top down 
approach, whereas FEE as a genuine and 
ideal situation of minority protection is more 
often used as a bottom-up approach.  
 
VI. DISCRIMINATION AND 
EQUALITY CONFIRMATION  
A move towards equality by the European 
Commission that should not be forgotten in 
this paper and that needs extra explanation is 
the 'renewed‟ manifestation of non-
discrimination and equality used by the 
European Commission. In general, this 
manifestation could possibly best be 
described as the tendency to use substantive 
equality in addition to formal equality more 
often in international non-discrimination and 
equality law. 
The 'renewed manifestation of non-
discrimination and equality' is most 
comprehensively described by the already 
mentioned communication of the European 
Commission.
96
 In this 2008 Note the 
Commission addresses a 'renewed 
commitment to non-discrimination and 
equal opportunities'. Besides this, the 
Commission makes an important statement: 
„Identical treatment may result in formal 
equality, but it cannot suffice to bring about 
equality in practice.‟97 With this quote, a 
reason is given why there might be a 
„rapidly growing appreciation of the role 
positive action can play to redress the lack 
of substantive equality in societies.‟98 
Through a precise reading of this quote, the 
European Commission seems to decline the 
use of formal equality, since „formal 
equality cannot bring equality in practice‟. 
The statement of the European Commission 
is not, however, very clear about this: two 
possible interpretations for this development 
could be given. First, the European 
Commissions‟ 'renewed manifestation of 
non-discrimination and equality' replaces 
formal equality with substantive equality. 
Secondly, and more likely, the commission 
still sees a role for formal equality in 
addition to substantive equality, but possibly 
smaller than before.  
Nevertheless, in both cases the 
Commission shifts their attention from 
formal equality to substantive equality, 
which could have large implications for 
general non-discrimination law, especially 
since formal equality is still the only way to 
address individual justice, because it gives at 
least a minimum standard of non-
discrimination protection. By shifting the 
attention to only substantive equality or to a 
lesser extent to formal equality, there is the 
danger that current non-discrimination 
protection mechanisms lose effectiveness. 
On the other side this shift opens the door to 
new forms of non-discrimination protection 
that could possibly break-up the status quo 
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between the majority and the minority 
(realizing that formal non discrimination 
procedures often are especially less 
accessible for groups that are vulnerable for 
discrimination). This brings attention to the 
question to what extent formal equality still 
plays a role in the current non-
discrimination and equality policies of the 
European Commission. This occurs because 
substantive equality can only give a high 
standard of protection against discrimination 
and disfavours in connection or conjunction 
with formal equality. Both systems of 
equality and non-discrimination complement 
each other in giving a higher level of 
protection. 
However, to us, it seems from the 
perspective of national minorities that the 
renewed manifestation of non-
discrimination and equality from the 
perspective of national minorities is more a 
confirmation of old EU equality trends, 
rather than a new notion of equality. This is 
especially so because, after the introduction 
of the manifestation, no structural special 
measures or positive action policies have 
been taken to make substantive equality for 
national minorities effectively.  
 
VII. EXISTING 
IMPLEMENTATION 
PROBLEMS FOR 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
In the following part of this working paper, 
we attempt to point out a few of the still 
existing problems we came across during 
our research in relation to the practical use 
of 'substantive equality.‟ First, we will 
provide details to that question, specifically 
why and how substantive and formal 
equality are interrelated and connected. 
Moreover, we will discuss difficulties for 
courts in distinguishing positive action from 
unjustified discrimination.  
As Henrard explains, full equality 
mechanisms for national minorities contain 
in its most ideal situation two pillars.
99
 Pillar 
one includes non-discrimination 
mechanisms and individual human rights 
that are of special relevance for national 
minorities, while pillar two contains 
minority specific standards aimed at 
protecting and promoting the right to 
identity of minorities.
100
 From this 
description of genuine minority protection 
by Henrard, one can see that individual 
justice and general non-discrimination 
mechanisms are major parts of the 
protection mechanism of national 
minorities.
101
 Although individual justice 
and general non-discrimination mechanisms 
are not working effectively enough in cases 
of national minorities - as shown by the EU-
MIDI-surveys – this does not alter the fact 
that these mechanisms still form the most 
important tool for national minorities to 
bring a discrimination case before a court. 
Therefore, keeping in mind that 
formal equality is the only way to address 
individual justice, it is important to clarify 
whether formal equality plays a role in the 
new attention for substantive equality‟ of the 
European Commission. So if substantive 
equality would not be implemented in 
addition to formal equality, this could even 
worsen the already not very effective non-
discrimination policies for minorities for 
two reasons.  
First, as Henrard argued, formal 
equality forms the basis of minority 
protection where substantive equality is only 
subsidiary, and when formal equality is 
insufficient. Secondly, by shifting the 
attention within European equality law from 
formal equality to positive action, there 
might be less attention paid to the fact that 
there is still a major need for the 
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development of a broader scope of formal 
equality inside community non-
discrimination law. Currently the scope of 
community non-discrimination law only 
covers education, housing, and a broad 
definition of workplace. Also one should not 
forget that both equality directives can only 
`reach as far as the field of the EU 
competences.
102
A widening of this scope 
would be very welcome for the protection of 
vulnerable national minorities.  
Another current problem with the 
use of substantive equality is that it seems to 
be difficult for courts to distinguish justified 
discrimination or positive action from 
unjustified or prohibited discrimination. 
Andreea Grgic showed this very well by 
analysing the example of the ECtHR Orsus 
case.
103
 
In the Orsus case,
104
 segregation in 
education of Roma children was accepted, 
under the name of a positive measure, not 
only by the Croatian Constitutional Court 
but also by the lower chamber of the 
ECtHR. Only the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR was able to distinguish positive 
action from prohibited discrimination by 
requiring a justification for the positive 
action in combination with a tailored aim for 
the action. According to the ECtHR court in 
the Orsus case, segregation as a special 
measure can only be allowed if it is 
objectively justified by a legitimate aim and 
that the means of achieving that aim were 
appropriate, necessary and proportionate.
105
 
In this particular case Roma children were 
split up in separated classroom for language 
reasons, without giving them the justifying 
language improvement education. This latter 
proved to the Grand Chamber that the 
separation was discriminatory in character 
instead of being a positive measure. As the 
Orsus case made clear, even for the ECtHR 
it is not always easy to distinguish positive 
action or special measures from 
discriminatory conduct. This is a serious 
barrier to implement positive action on a 
larger scale for disadvantaged national 
minority groups.  
What else can we learn about 
positive action from the Orsus case? 
Moreover the case confirmed that a positive 
measure should always, „in accordance with 
the principle of proportionality, […] [serve] 
a legitimate aim and remain within the limits 
of what is appropriate and necessary in order 
to achieve that aim, reconciling the principle 
of equal treatment as far as possible with the 
requirement of the aim pursued.‟ This means 
that the aim of positive action always must 
be directly related to the justification of the 
positive action. As we saw e.g. in the Orsus 
case, these two features of positive action 
make a crucial difference in the way a 
measure could violate the non-
discrimination principle. And this is why 
special attention needs to be taken when 
distinguishing between positive action 
measures and discriminatory measures. This 
is particularly important since positive 
action measures could be used as a way to 
treat groups or individuals differently 
without justification and in the same could 
be (mis)used as a form of intended or 
unintended prohibited discrimination. 
 
VIII. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN 
PRACTICE 
During our research we saw an emerging, 
albeit slow, change, in the way that 
institutions and even courts in the EU are 
using or allow (sometimes) for a shift of the 
burden of proof, statistical evidence and 
positive action or special measures to 
guarantee or to promote substantive 
equality. Where ECtHR jurisprudence on 
equality was for most of its time based on a 
formal conception of equality, it has begun 
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to give equality a more substantive 
approach.
106
  
In the recent cases Orsus and others 
v. Croatia
107
, Sampanis and others v. 
Greece
108
 and particularly, the D. H. and 
others v. Czech Republic case
109
 a 
„breakthrough for a more substantive model 
of equality in the ECtHR‟ and „clear rules on 
indirect discrimination under Article 14 
became clear.‟110 This development showed 
that Article 14 of the ECtHR has evolved 
from a strictly formal to a more substantive 
model of equality.  
Some caution with this statement is, 
however, needed. The above cases only 
show that a few Roma were able to find 
remedy in cases of discrimination, which 
was not the case for other minorities. Also 
the little amount of Roma cases we found 
compared to the huge discrimination 
problems Roma face in the EU is making 
this development less common than we 
might have hoped.  
However, according to O‟Connell, 
the European Human Rights Court is more 
and more „open to adopt a substantive 
equality perspective that stresses the need to 
protect vulnerable and disadvantaged 
minorities.‟111 In this context it is also worth 
mentioning the case of Thlimmenos v. 
Greece on 6 April 2000.
112
 This case made 
clear, according to Henrard, that the 
prohibition of discrimination can entail an 
obligation for states to treat persons 
differently whose situations are significantly 
different.
113
 Other authors such as Dimitry 
Kochenov claim that a substantive 
component in EU community Law is 
entirely missing at the moment.
114
 He says 
that the „European Union suffers from an 
empty formalistic reading of the principle of 
equality‟.115 Although Kochenov certainly 
has a point, we found little evidence for a 
trend in a different direction.  
New developments for the possible 
use of positive action in employment should 
be found through CJEU case-law or the 
implementation of Article 5 of the Race 
Directive. Where the CJEU had 
jurisprudence about gender discrimination 
already before the implementing of the 2000 
Directives, it has developed less 
jurisprudence since 2000 in respect to most 
grounds of the directives, except for „age‟. It 
remains, however, unclear how Article 5 of 
the Race Directive will be applied by 
member states. Several publications show 
examples of countries that implemented 
positive action and national courts allowing 
positive action
116
, nevertheless, the 
implemented positive measures seem less 
structured and mostly have a voluntary 
character. This has the possible result of 
states choosing to implement certain 
positive measures and others not, or being 
able to implement positive measures only 
for certain groups. It is certainly not without 
coincidence that positive action mostly 
developed in gender cases, disability cases 
and less for ethnic or language minorities. 
Nevertheless, research of the 
Migration Policy Group showed that the 
CJEU - although it uses primarily a formal 
equality approach - is occasionally willing to 
allow for positive action at least as a 
possible justification for indirect gender 
discrimination.
117
 Some authors see this as a 
positive development for national 
minorities. Recently, there is a large 
discussion about the implementation scope 
of judgements in regard to the 2000 Equality 
Directives. This became especially 
important since CJEU‟s case-law established 
that the 2000 Directives should be 
interpreted as a given expression to the 
general principle of equal treatment. This 
discussion expresses the question of how far 
judgements of one ground (gender or age, 
which are the most developed anti- 
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discrimination grounds so far at the CJEU) 
of the 2000 Directives are applicable to the 
other directives' grounds like racial or ethnic 
origin.
118
 This is especially important for the 
protection of national minorities and ethnic 
minorities since it could give jurisprudence 
to the CJEU over the RED in regard to the 
discrimination ground of racial and ethnical 
origin, where there is none at the moment. 
Some first indication for a possible 
interdependence between the different 
grounds of the directives is seen in the UK. 
Although it was an exception, national 
courts did refer to gender discrimination 
jurisprudence in their judgements in respect 
of other grounds covered by the 2000 
Directives. 
119
  
Less positive is the fact that, to date, 
States are only obliged to promote or allow 
positive action but not obliged by the FCNM 
or the RED to implement positive action or 
special measures. This again makes both 
legal instruments only particular to the party 
member states, which then can still opt 
whether they want to implement special 
measures or not. This latter would be the 
founding for a legal base of substantive 
equality and with this means the „renewed 
manifestation of non-discrimination and 
equality‟ is rather a confirmation of old EU 
equality trends because, since the 
implementation of the manifestation, no 
effective measures have been taken to make 
substantive equality structural.  
 
IX. EXCURSUS: THE VADILITY 
OF FEE 
Despite the introduction of „the new 
commitment to equality and non-
discrimination‟ and „full and effective 
equality‟ major discrimination and 
inequality problems in Europe still exist. 
These two concepts seem at first glance to 
contain a very hopeful and high ideal of 
equality, but in practice these concepts have 
little standing at the local level. Two reasons 
could explain this. First, the concepts seem 
to be imprecise in how the ideal situation of 
equality should be implemented and 
reached. A probable second reason is that 
these concepts do not reflect social reality.  
By researching the „renewed 
manifestation of non-discrimination and 
equality‟ and the whole issue of FEE, we got 
the impression that both concepts are more 
or less empty. Both give the impression that 
in Europe, „everyone is equal and that in 
Europe everyone has the same 
opportunities.‟ In practice it is not likely that 
this equality ideal becomes reality via the 
use of these equality manifestations. Neither 
concepts seem to be formulated to widen the 
definition of equality for all people living in 
the European Union. Additionally, none of 
the manifestations oblige states to 
implement positive action, nor do they 
oblige any European state to enlarge or 
boost the manifestation of formal equality.  
Another reason could be that the 
concepts of FEE and probably even more 
the „renewed commitment to non-
discrimination and equality‟ sustain, as 
Makkonen well explains, „the utopia that 
governments effectively can prevent people 
from engaging in discrimination and thereby 
eliminate all forms of discrimination‟.120 
Following his ideas, it seems more likely 
that the two new equality concepts disprove 
the ideal of genuine equality by providing 
citizens of the European Union - and 
especially members of majority 
communities – an identity based on the idea 
of „self-representation of belonging to an 
equal Europe‟. This is occurring, 
importantly, without the needed change of 
structures between the majority and the 
minority, through which a diversity solution 
that truly provides genuine equality to 
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minorities could be reached. According to 
Youssef T. Jabareen, „full and effective 
equality‟ can be reached through 
„participatory equality.‟121 This claim entails 
for most states a drastic and fundamental 
change of state‟s legal system, public 
spaces, social and economic structures and 
funding and space provided for ethnic, 
cultural and religious institutions. Yet this is 
not enough to reach FEE, according to 
Jabareen. It also requires a full and equal 
sharing by states of resources in the public, 
internal, and historical domain.
122
 Although 
Jabareen does not give a further explanation 
of the latter, one can view this in the very 
least tangibly: preservation and access to 
cultural heritage of minorities and history 
lessons at schools about the history of the 
minorities in a particular region.  
„Full and effective equality‟ as 
defined by ACFC does not entail any kind of 
recourse or redistribution, and does not even 
mention a first attempt in this direction. This 
leads to the precautionary conclusion that 
ideal equality frames, which do not change 
structural powers between minorities and 
majorities, often are built up with the goal of 
maintaining the majority position instead of 
improving the state of minorities. Genuine 
equality is seen by some authors as closed or 
even identical to equality of opportunities.     
John Rawls states that equality of 
opportunities is satisfied at the point of 
equality of fair opportunity.
123
 Equality of 
fair opportunity is reached in a society at the 
point where `individuals who have the same 
native talent and the same ambition will 
have the same prospects of success in 
competitions that determine who gets 
positions that generate superior benefits for 
their occupants. `
124
 Henrard however claims 
that in order to reach effective equality, one 
needs acknowledgement of differences in 
starting positions which might necessitate 
differential treatment.
125
 Equality of fair 
opportunities and full and effective equality 
might be helpful in forming ideas of how 
equal opportunities or genuine equality 
should be generated in competitive and 
private situations. Daily practice in Europe 
for vulnerable ethnic and national 
minorities, however, is still dominated by far 
reaching discrimination, a situation far from 
equality in fair opportunities. It is 
questionable if directives such as the RED 
structurally will change any of this. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Genuine Equality or full and effective 
equality is not easy to achieve due to the fact 
that individuals and groups often have 
different understandings of most equality 
notions. The main issue is that most of all 
the various equality protections can be 
reached at different levels and could include 
or exclude individuals and groups, 
depending on the used form of equality. 
Equality notions like FEE do not always 
provide improvement for vulnerable groups. 
Even when this idea contains a high 
standard of minority protection, it is still 
possible that the mechanism excludes 
particular groups.  
The evidence for general non-
discrimination mechanisms as used by 
national and ethnic minorities is overall 
rather limited. The most significant 
development in this regard concerns the top-
down impact by case law of supra-national 
courts. This is even more valid when cases 
of Roma claims are included in the data, 
which were left out in the first part of this 
project. Regarding the bottom-up 
development of non-discrimination, the 
findings are the most limited. Developments 
in non-discrimination legislation can 
therefore not claim to be at the forefront of 
the movement from formal to substantive 
equality of national minorities. Merely the 
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link to the „new minorities‟ of migrants and 
refugees and their respective protection 
mechanisms might be an avenue for national 
minorities to promote their cause, but one 
has to monitor whether that development 
will progress. 
We saw that, ideally, special 
measures for minorities need to be of a 
permanent character to overcome the natural 
distance to the majority. The acceptance of 
this permanent character would create an 
application of the principle of substantive 
equality through special measures. 
 However, we conclude that positive 
action and special measures are still 
uncommon and certainly not for national 
minorities, but are a „derogation‟ within the 
non-discrimination principle.
126
 Being aware 
of the fact that special measures and positive 
action often are only allowed when formal 
equality mechanisms are insufficient to 
guarantee full equality and optimal minority 
protection, we see that currently formal 
equality mechanisms are, despite 
improvements, still too weak to guarantee 
genuine equality for national minorities. 
Also, substantive equality mechanisms still 
don't seem strong enough to cover this gap 
and do not realize genuine equality. 
However, substantive equality seems, for the 
moment, the only way to overcome past and 
current mechanisms of discrimination. It 
could be dangerous in case the current 
attention to substantive equality shifts the 
attention away from the building of a 
strong(er) formal non-discrimination 
protection mechanism. This all feeds into 
the concluding realisation that, by 
guaranteeing Full and Effective Equality, 
formal equality still plays a major role while 
positive action only comes into play when 
formal equality seems to be ineffective or 
insufficient. The lack of clarity on the 
differences between discriminatory policies 
and positive measures also do not help in 
this respect. Looking at the current situation, 
states are still not obliged by any convention 
or court judgement to implement positive 
action. More positive is that states are at 
least allowed to implement positive action 
(for example by the Race Equality 
Directive) and that it seems to become more 
and more common for states to also use 
positive measures. In some exceptional 
cases States could even be held responsible 
to treat persons differently whose situation is 
significantly different.
127
 It remains to be 
seen whether the proliferation of new 
protected grounds will inspire the CJEU to 
tailor its level of scrutiny of positive action 
to racial or ethnic groups.
128
 It also remains 
to be seen if the use of positive measures for 
certain group guarantees more equality 
between all groups, with the danger that 
states can give a preference to create 
positive measures only for more „inner 
circle‟ vulnerable groups such as elderly 
people, the disabled, and women, instead of 
ethnic and racial minorities.  
 This study makes clear that notions 
like equality and non-discrimination are 
subject to time periods and political ideas, 
which raises the question of what we mean 
by equality for minorities and how we 
expect substantive equality to change over 
the years. It is, however, clear that reaching 
substantive equality for national minorities, 
let alone genuine equality, will still take 
time.  
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